jurors, and in view of the further fact that whatever influence they exert adverse to the interests of the defendant is counteracted by the oath of each juror to decide the issues solely on the basis of the evidence adduced and to render an impartial verdict.
H.P.
CRIMINAL LAw-DOUBLE JEoPARDY.-Defendant was charged, pleaded guilty to and convicted of three separate offenses in separate indictments, for reckless driving, driving without a license, and for violating Section 43 of the Penal Law 1 by blowing the horn of his car in a manner to annoy and disturb people, racing his car through the street at a high and dangerous rate of speed, using profane and indecent language, causing a crowd to collect and failing to stop his car when ordered to do so. He contended on appeal that he was twice placed in jeopardy 2 because the acts comprising the violation of Section 43 were the same as those constituting the reckless driving. Held, conviction affirmed. The acts constituting the offense in the third indictment were separate and distinct. There was no double jeopardy in violation of Section 1938 of the Penal Law. Defendant's position is that the acts separately charged are part of the same transaction. Since reckless driving must be determined from all of the surrounding circumstances where a statute does not designate particular acts, 4 he contends that the racing of the car through the street, the failure to stop the car, the blowing of the horn, the use of profane language and the causing of a crowd to collect were all part and parcel of the same transaction, comprising those circumstances from which the court already deduced that he drove recklessly and for which he has been punished. To again punish him for the same offense would be double jeopardy. mits any act which seriously injures the, person or property of another, or which seriously disturbs or endangers the public peace or health, or which openly outrages public decency, for which no other punishment is expressly prescribed by this chapter is guilty of a misdemeanor; . . ." 2U S. CoxsT. AMEND. V: a person shall not be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; N. Y. CONST. § 6: "no person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." 3 N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1938. "An act or omission which is made criminal and punishable in different ways, by different provisions of law, may be punished under any one of those provisions but not under more than one; and a conviction or acquittal under one bars a prosecution for the same act or omission under any other provision. [ VOL. 22
RECENT DECISIONS
His position is best supported by the decision in the case of People v. Krank, 5 where there was double jeopardy because both indictments depended on the same criminal act, and prosecution under both would be in violation of Section 1938 of the Penal Law. There, the charge was the sale of liquor on a Saturday without a license, the proofs revealing, however, a sale on Sunday which was illegal with or without a license. The question was whether the added charge of a sale of liquor on Sunday would result in double jeopardy. There is concurrence by both prosecution and defense here that under those circumstances defendant would be twice placed in jeopardy because in each charge the criminal act was basically the same. 6 On what grounds, then, did the court here decide against defendant?
In People v. Krank, the facts proving a sale without a license had to be added to the basic act of disposing of liquor before the offense of the first indictment could be made criminal. There remained only the evidentiary fact of a transaction on Sunday, which, added to the basic fact of disposition of liquor, failed to constitute the criminal act, unless there was added thereto the evidentiary fact of a sale. And the sale was the very fact which made the first indictment criminal. Therefore, in People v. Krank criminality depended on the same evidentiary fact of sale. Without it the second charge could not succeed. It could form the basis of either charge but not of both. To hold to the contrary would be, in effect, to say that an assault culminating in murder does not merge into the murder and might therefore be punishable separately after the charge for murder. This would be adverse to the weight of authority.
7
In the instant case, however, the lawful act of operating a vehicle was made unlawful as soon as it was proven that the driver operated without a license. When it was proven from all of the facts related to the operation of the vehicle that the driver evinced an attitude of disregard of the probable or possible injurious consequences of his operation, he was guilty of reckless driving. It was not the mere racing of the car through the streets alone or the speed of the vehicle, but a consideration of all the related acts as a whole that determined the necessary unlawful state of mind. Although it might be argued that the act of racing a car through the street carried great weight in determining reckless driving and was again used in the third indictment, the third indictment does not rely on that act alone. It stands because proof of the blowing of a horn, the failure to stop the vehicle when directed to do so, the use -of profane and indecent language and the causing of a crowd to collect are so added to and incidentally related to the operation of the vehicle as to constitute the offense against the public contemplated under Section 43 of the Penal Law. These latter acts contributed in no way to the determination of recklessness. They were separate and distinct. The acts comprising the offense in each of the three indictments were distinct in law and in fact. 8 The defendant's contention could only succeed if the same transaction test were the rule in New York. Although this test finds support in New Jersey, 9 the rule in New York is that double jeopardy will exist only if the acts constituting the offenses charged are the same in law and fact, irrespective of the consideration that they relate to and grow out of the same transaction.
10 New York decisions favorable to defendant and composed of similar facts 11 have since been overruled in New York as "illogical" and "not good law." 12
The greatest difficulty in measuring double jeopardy has been encountered where the second offense is wholly contained within the first; I' or where a crime of degrees or an attempt to commit a crime 1 4 or a continuing offense is involved.' 5 Successive prosecutions in such instances are more likely to result in double jeopardy. And this is logical, for the greater includes the lesser, a degree is a portion of the whole and an attempt is inferior to the thing attempted. Tests to measure double jeopardy have made inconsistent appearances in other jurisdictions. 
